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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS. 
Use of a fixed asset limit, without resource spend down, is 
not consistent with the objectives of the Medicaid statute. 
The federal requirement in section 1396a(a)(17)(D) that a state 
use an income spend down impliedly requires a state to use a 
resource spend down. An applicant could spend down excess assets 
before applying for Medicaid coverage and measuring one's assets 
as of the first of the month, without taking into account 
incurred medical expenses is unreasonable. It is unreasonable 
for the Division of Health Care Financing to determine 
eligibility for Medicaid coverage, under the "Medically Needy" 
program, on the basis of the amount of the applicant's 
accumulated resources. 
ARGUMENTS 
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS DETERMINATION THAT 
THE UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE 
FINANCING WAS NOT REQUIRED TO USE "RESOURCE SPEND DOWN" 
WHEN DETERMINING ELIGIBILITY FOR MEDICAID UNDER THE 
"MEDICALLY NEEDY" PROGRAM 
1. Use of a fixed asset limit, without resource spend down, is 
not consistent with the objectives of the Medicaid statute. 
In its response to Appellant's ("Allen") opening brief, the 
Respondent, Utah Department of Health, Division of Health Care 
Financing (hereinafter "the Division") makes several incorrect 
statements regarding the Medicaid program. At page 15 of its 
brief, the Division correctly notes that a medically needy 
applicant must meet certain income criteria. It then refers to 
1 
certain figures established by the Social Security Administration 
at 20 C.F.R. §416.1205(c)(1991). The section of the federal 
regulations cited by the Division actually is a limitation on 
resources and has nothing to do with income limits. The monthly 
income limits for medically needy applicants is set by the 
Division pursuant to regulatory authority found at 42 C.F.R. 
§§436.301(a)(1)(i) & 436.814. Currently, the income level for 
two persons is set at $430.00 per month. 
At several pages in its brief (pages 11,18, 19 n. 2, 22, 
28), the Division states it is significant that the categorically 
needy Medicaid program does not permit a spenddown of excess 
resources in order to become "categorically needy". It then 
cites 20 C.F.R. §§416.1201, .1025 & .1210 in support of this 
point. That the cited sections do not permit a spenddown is of 
no significance for this appeal, since the regulations deal with 
eligibility for the federal Supplemental Security Income (SSI) 
program. Persons found eligible for SSI would be categorically 
eligible for Medicaid. Had Congress required a spenddown in the 
sections referred to by the Division, it would have automatically 
imposed a medically needy program upon all states participating 
in the Medicaid program. The fact that the sections cited by the 
Division do not permit a resource spenddown is irrelevant to the 
issues on appeal. 
Starting at page 19 of its brief, the Division argues that 
the medically needy program is not a national health insurance 
plan. This has never been Allen's argument. He has simply 
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maintained that when the state of Utah approved a medically needy 
program, it guaranteed a certain level of resources which can 
only be protected by implementation of a resource spenddown. 
That purpose was not created out of thin air as the Division 
suggests but, instead, follows logically from the stated purpose 
of the medically needy program. 
Moreover, the decisions in Hession v. Illinois Dep't of 
Public Aid, 129 111. 2d 535, 544 N.E.2d 751 (1989), affirming 
Hession v. Illinois Dep't of Pub Aid, 163 111. App. 3d 553, 516 
N.E.2d 820 (1987), Haley v. Commissioner of Public Welfare, 394 
Mass. 466, 476 N.E.2d 572 (1985) and Kempson v. North Carolina 
Dep't of Human Resources, 100 N.C. App. 482, 397 S.E.2d 314 
(1990), aff'd by divided court, 328 N.C. 722, 403 S.E.2d 279 
(1991) were not mistakenly relied upon by Allen, as suggested by 
the Division at page 23 of its brief. Rather, if the Division 
had read these decisions carefully, it would have noted that none 
of the state legislatures referred to in these decisions had 
explicitly authorized a resource spenddown. The Division's 
suggestion that the courts making these decisions concluded that 
a resource spenddown was required by "clear manifestations of 
state legislative intent" is simply not true. Inherent in a 
legislature's approval of a medically needy program is a 
determination that a medically needy individual's retention of a 
certain level of resources must be assured. Determining 
eligibility without a resource spenddown "does not comply with 
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the requirement that an individual be allowed to retain a certain 
level of resources." Haley, at 579. 
The Division's statement at page 24 that the court in Haley 
"identified numerous provisions in the state laws about the 
medically needy program that strongly evince the state 
legislators intent that its medically needy program use a 
resource spenddown methodology..." is not an accurate reflection 
of the Haley court's analysis. The Haley court identified 
language regarding the purpose of a medically needy program. Its 
conclusion that the purpose could only be met by a resource 
spenddown can also by reached in this case. The Hession court 
looked at the objectives of the Illinois Code in establishing a 
medically needy program. The objectives mentioned in the 
Illinois Code are also inherent in the Division's medically needy 
program. These objectives include: (1) the providing of health 
benefits for persons otherwise eligible for basic maintenance 
under SSI and AFDC but who have failed to qualify on the basis of 
need, and who have insufficient income and resources to meet the 
costs of necessary medical care; (2) the maintaining of continued 
independence and (3) preservation of a persons' limited 
resources. All of these objectives are inherent in the 
Division's medically needy program. The Division seeks to 
preserve limited resources of medically needy applicants by 
setting a resource limit at $2000.00 for a single individual or 
$3000.00 for a couple. By delegating authority for the Utah 
Medicaid Program to the Division and by annually approving a 
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budget which includes the medically needy program, the Utah 
legislature has effectively approved the Division's objectives. 
Thus, it is the intent of the Utah legislature that these 
objectives be met. By failing to apply a resource spenddown, the 
Division defeats that intent. Under the current plan# an 
individual in Utah who incurs large bills must deplete assets 
intended by the legislature to be disregarded. As the Kempson 
court concluded, a policy of not allowing a resource spenddown is 
"flawed" and "unfair". Kempson, at 317. 
2. The federal requirement in section 1396a(a)(17)(D) that a 
state must use an income spend down impliedly requires a state to 
use resource spend down. 
In its second point at pages 27-30 of its brief, the 
Division argues that it is rational to allow a spenddown for 
income purposes but not for resources. It repeats its irrelevant 
argument that Congress did not allow a resource spenddown for the 
categorically needy and, therefore, it must not have intended 
such treatment for optional medically needy. As has been pointed 
out previously, the distinction has no bearing on this appeal. 
Throughout its brief, and in this section in particular, the 
Division attempts to portray Allen and other medically needy 
individuals as possessing substantial assets. This is not true 
is Allen's case, nor is it likely to be the case in many others. 
Allen's house was exempt as were most of his other assets, 
leaving only a small savings and checking account as assets to be 
considered. The Division's suggestion at page 29 that permitting 
a resource spenddown would open up coverage to a "huge pool of 
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potentially medically needy" is pure speculation with no basis in 
fact. If, as Allen has argued throughout his appeal, use of a 
resource spenddown is necessary to carry out the purpose of the 
medically needy program, his legitimate claim to coverage should 
not be denied on the basis of speculation. 
The Division further strains the credibility of its argument 
by suggesting that it would be administratively difficult to 
evaluate a claimant's assets for resource spenddown purposes. 
Income, being subject to change, poses far more difficulties than 
assets which are generally static in nature. The Division's 
conclusions suffer from the same faulty premise that medically 
needy applicants would have substantial assets, including 
"collectibles and stock not publicly traded..." Again, the 
Division relies on speculation and ignores the fact that it has a 
sophisticated computer system which is currently tracking assets 
and income on a regular basis for the entire Medicaid program. 
There is no factual basis to support the Division's conclusion 
that administrative burdens would support a conclusion to draw a 
line between income and resources for spenddown purposes. 
3. An applicant could spend down excess assets before applying 
for Medicaid coverage and measuring one's assets as of the first 
of the month, without taking into account incurred medical 
expenses is unreasonable. 
The Division argues that Allen and Judge Bench (dissenting) 
misstated the law when saying that Allen could have spent down 
his assets prior to applying for Medicaid. The Division reasons 
that because assets are calculated as of the "first moment of the 
6 
month", a spend down of one's excess assets before applying for 
Medicaid coverage, is impossible. 
While it is true that the policy of measuring one's assets 
as of the first moment of the month prevents applicants from 
spending down those assets during the month, Allen notes that a 
spend down is still possible prior to the first moment of the 
month. In addition, Allen argues that measuring one's assets as 
of the first of the month, without taking into account incurred 
medical expenses is unreasonable. 
An applicant who is familiar with the asset rules and 
regulations of the Medicaid program, could bring his or her 
assets into line with those rules as soon as their insurance 
coverage ends and prior to the month in which medical expenses 
are incurred. An applicant who is unfamiliar with these 
requirements is unreasonably "blind-sided" by them and excluded 
from eligibility. 
For example, a prospective applicant who is familiar with 
the Medicaid rules and regulations could make sure that their 
non-exempt assets never exceed the $3,000 limit. Then when the 
applicant receives medical treatment, he or she will be eligible 
for Medicaid. But an applicant such as Allen, being unfamiliar 
with the Medicaid program, does not know that spending down 
another $129 of his assets could result in Medicaid eligibility, 
if needed. 
In addition, it is unreasonable to measure one's assets as 
of the first of the month, without taking into account medical 
7 
expenses incurred during that month. Allen had $3,129.00 in 
assets as of the first moment of the months of January and 
February, 1991. R. 98. But he incurred over $40,000 in medical 
bills during that period of time. R. 11-13, 98. His non-exempt 
assets wouldn't cover those bills. Therefore, the amount of 
assets held at the beginning of the month bears no relationship 
to Allen's actual financial well-being and ability to pay his own 
medical expenses. Only by considering his assets in light of his 
obligations incurred during the month, can his assets be 
reasonably evaluated, as required by the Medicaid Act. 42 
U.S.C.S § 1396a(a)(17)(C) (Law. Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 1992). The 
policy of measuring one's assets as of the beginning of the month 
is an unreasonable means of evaluating assets and should be held 
void. 
4. It is unreasonable for the Division of Health Care Financing 
to determine eligibility for Medicaid coverage, under the 
"Medically Needy" program, on the basis of the amount of the 
applicant's accumulated resources. 
The Division argues that it is reasonable to determine 
eligibility for Medicaid coverage, under the "Medically Needy" 
program, on the basis of the amount of the applicant's 
accumulated resources. The Division reasons that people with 
accumulated resources over the resource limits are better able to 
provide for their medical needs since they generally have greater 
flexibility in making alternative arrangements for their medical 
needs. 
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Allen's case provides ample evidence of the flaws of this 
reasoning. Allen, because he had $129 too much in his bank 
accounts, was afforded no coverage of his over $40,000 in medical 
bills.1 On the other hand, an applicant who does not exceed the 
limit would be afforded coverage of even a small amount such as 
$300 in medical bills. Applying the Division's reasoning says 
that Allen is better able to meet his medical bills of $40,000 by 
using his $129 of excess resources, than the other applicant is 
to meet his medical bills of $300, because he or she has no 
excess resources. Allen's objective of covering a $40,000 debt 
with $129 appears less attainable than the other applicant who 
would only need $300 to meet his or her obligation. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court should reverse the decision of the Court 
of Appeals and find that a resource spenddown applies. The Court 
Respondent argues that Petitioner and his wife owned a 
$65,000 home along with $10,000 in cash and other assets, in 
addition to property exempted from consideration, which place 
them in a class of persons who have accumulated assets in excess 
of resource limits. Respondent was denied Medicaid on the basis 
of his bank accounts alone. R. 78-79, 95. The other assets, 
although perhaps exempt as medical necessities, were not 
considered in reaching the decision of denial. R. 79. The home 
is exempt. Utah Administrative Code R810-304-411 (1991). Only 
the $129 excess in savings may be considered here, as being in 
excess of the resource limit. 
In addition, Respondent says that Petitioner could have 
protected himself for $400-600 per month for the eighteen months 
until he would receive Medicare coverage. This disregards the 
fact that Petitioner said only that an application would be 
accepted. With his pre-existing condition, he was never 
guaranteed that, even for the $400-600, his application would be 
approved. R. 39-40. And at those rates, his savings and 
checking account funds would not have provided eighteen months of 
coverage. 
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should find that Allen could spend down his assets to become 
eligible for Medicaid. 
Dated this 10 day of Qc\o\>*r # 1992. 
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC. 
By Steven Elmo Averett 
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ADDENDUM 
20 CFR Ch. Ill (4-1-91 Edition) 
§ 416.1025 Records and reports. 
(a) The State will establish and 
maintain the records and furnish the 
schedules, financial, cost, and other re-
ports relating to the administration of 
the disability programs as wTe may re-
quire. 
(b) The State will permit us and the 
Comptroller General of_the_United 
States (including duly authorized rep-
resentatives) access to and the right to 
examine records relating to the work 
which the State performs under these 
regulations.-These records will be re-
tained by the State for the periods of 
time specified for retention of records 
in the Federal Procurement Regula-
tions (41 CFR parts 1-20). 
§ 416.1201 Resources; general. 
(a) Resources; defined. For purposes 
of this subpart L, resources means 
cash or other liquid assets or any real 
or personal property that an individ-
ual (or spouse, if any) owns and could 
convert to cash to be used for his or 
her support and maintenance. 
(1) If the individual has the right, 
authority or power to liquidate the 
property or his or her share of the 
property, it is considered a resource. If 
a property right cannot be liquidated, 
the property will not be considered a 
resource of the individual (or spouse). 
(2) Support and maintenance assist-
ance not counted as income under 
§ 416.1157(c) will not be considered i 
resource. /,•; 
(3) Except for cash reimbursement 
of medical or social services expenses' 
already paid for by the individual,* 
cash received for medical or social 
services that is not income under 
§ 416.1103 (a) or (b) is not a resource 
for the calendar month following the 
month of its receipt. However, cash re: 
tained until the first moment of the 
second calendar month following its 
receipt is a resource at that time. . * 
(b) Liquid resources. Liquid r&T 
sources are cash or other property 
wrhich can be converted to cash within 
20 days, excluding certain nonwork 
days as explained in § 416.120(d). Ex-
amples of resources that are ordinarily 
liquid are stocks, bonds, mutual fund 
shares, promissory notes, mortgages,' 
life insurance policies, bank accounts 
(savings and checking), certificates of. 
resources, other than cash, are evalu:^  
ated according to the individual's, 
equity in the resources. a* 
(c) Nonliquid resources. (1) Nonli-
quid resources are property which is 
not cash and which cannot be convert-1 
ed to cash within 20 days excluding 
certain nonwork days as explained in 
§ 416.120(d). Examples of resources 
that are ordinarily nonliquid are loan 
agreements, household goods, automo-
biles, trucks, tractors, boats, machin-* 
ery, livestock, buildings and land. Non-
liquid resources are evaluated accord-
ing to their equity value except as otlv 
erwise provided. (See § 416.1218 for 
treatment of automobiles.) 
(2) For purposes of this subpart U 
the equity value of an item is defined 
as: ,V 
(i) The price that item can reason-
ably be expected to sell for on the 
open market in the particular geo-L 
graphic area involved; minus 
(ii) Any encumbrances. 
[40 FR 48915, Oct. 20, 1975, as amended at^  
44 FR 43266, July 24, 1979; 48 FR 33259, 
July 21, 1983; 52 FR 4283, Feb. 11, 1987; 52 
FR 16845, May 6, 1987; 53 FR 23231, June 
21, 1988] & 
§ 416.1205 Limitation on resources. 
(a) Individual with no eligible 
spouse. An aged, blind, or disabled in-
dividual with no spouse is eligible for 
benefits under title XVI of the Act if 
his or her nonexcludable resources do 
not exceed $1,500 prior to January 1/ 
1985, and all other eligibility require-
ments are met. An individual who is 
living with an ineligible spouse is eligi-
ble for benefits under title XVI of the 
Act if his or her nonexcludable re-
sources, including the resources of the 
spouse, do not exceed $2,250 prior to 
January 1, 1985, and all other eligibil-
ity requirements are met. 
(b) Individual with an eligible 
spouse. An aged, blind, or disabled in-
dividual who has an eligible spouse is 
eligible for benefits under title XVI of 
the Act if their nonexcludable re-
sources do not exceed $2,250 prior to 
January 1, 1985, and all other eligibil-
ity requirements are met. 
(c) Effective January 1, 1985 and 
later. The resources limits and effec-
tive dates for January 1, 1985 and 
later are as follows: 
[50 FR 38982, Sept. 26, 19853 
20 CFR Ch. Ill 
§416.1210 
§ 416.1210 Exclusions from resources; gen-
eral. 
In determining the resources of an 
individual (and spouse, if any) the fol-
low mg items shall be excluded 
(a) The home (including the land ap-
pertaining thereto) to the extent its 
value does not exceed the amount set 
forth in § 416 1212 
(b) Household goods and personal ef-
fects to the extent that their total 
value does not exceed the amount pro-
vided in § 416 1216, 
(c) An automobile to the extent that 
its \alue does not exceed the amount 
provided in § 416 1218, 
(d) Property of a trade or business 
which is essential to the means of self-
support as provided m § 416 1222, 
(e) Nonousiness property which is 
essential to the means of self-support 
as pro\ided in § 416 1224, 
(f) Resources of a blind or disabled 
individual ^hich are necessary to ful-
fill an approved plan for achieving 
self-support as provided in § 416.1226, 
(g) Stock in regional or village corpo-
rations held by natives of Alaska 
during the twenty-year period in 
Vvhich the stock is inalienable pursu-
ant to the Alaska Native Claims Set-
tlement Act (see § 416 1228), 
(h) Life insurance owned by an indi-
vidual (and spouse, if any) to the 
extent provided in § 416 1230, and 
(i) Restricted allotted land owned by 
an enrolled member of an Indian tribe 
as provided in § 416 1234, 
(j) Payments or benefits provided 
under a Federal statute other than 
title XVI of the Social Security Act 
wThere exclusion is required by such 
statute, 
(k) Disaster relief assistance as pro-
vided m § 416.1237, 
(1) Burial spaces and certain funds 
up to $1,500 for burial expenses as pro-
vided in § 416 1231. 
(m) Title XVI or title II retroactive 
payments as provided in § 416 1233. 
(n) Housing assistance as provided in 
§ 416.1238. 
t40 PR 48915, Oct 20.. 1975, as amended at 
41 FR 13338, Mar 30, 1976, 44 FR 15664. 
42 CFR Ch. IV (10-1-91 Editionf 
§435.301 
8 435.301 General rules. 
(a) A medicaid agency may provide 
Medicaid to individuals specified in 
this subpart who— 
(1) Either-
(i) Have income that meets the ap-
plicable standards in §5 435.812 
through 435.814, or 
(ii) If their income is more than al-
lowed under those standards, have in-
curred medical expenses at least equal 
Xo the difference between their income 
and the applicable income standard; 
and 
(2) Have resources that meet the ap-
plicable standards in §§435.840 
through 435.843. 
§436.814 
§436.814 Medically needy income stand-
ard: State plan requirements. 
(a) The State plan must specify the 
income standard for each covered 
medically needy group. 
(b) If the agency provides for an 
income standard that is not presumed 
to be reasonable under § 435.812, the 
State plan must describe that stand-
ard. 
[46 FR 47991, Sept. 30, 19813 
293 FAMILY SUPPORT ADMINISTRATION R810-304-411 
R810-304-411. Exempt Assets. 
S&vAllow the following exemptions for medical assis-
tance cases other than Indigent Medical cases. See 
Section 807 for exemptions specific to Indigent Medi-
'catcases. If an asset is not treated in that section, use 
"Qie^ F or C policy. 
* i l l One Home and Lot — All Cases 
-: Exclude one home, including a mobile home, and 
lot owned or being purchased and occupied by the 
client 
..„a. F and C Cases — The lot on which the home 
stands shall not exceed the average size of residential 
lots in the community where it is. Count the equity 
yaRie of property exceeding an average size lot. 
J^bVA, B and D Cases — Exempt the home and all 
contiguous property. 
':;/Exempt a life estate in a home if the owner of the 
life estate continues^to live in the home. 
i?JL One Home and Lot of a Person Who is A Resi-
dent of a Medical Institution — All Cases 
^ When a person who owns a home, or life estate in a 
'home, becomes a resident of a medical institution, the 
?hdme or life estate becomes countable unless: 
s^a. The person's stay in the medical institution will 
J^short term. A stay is short term if a doctor says 
gaat*the client is likely to return home within 6 
yEEnths of admission. Anyone in a medical institution 
fmore than 6 months after admission is long term, or 
igjt'The person states that he intends to return 
Pboinetlt does not matter whether the person actually 
frefarns home within 6 months. There is no time limit 
Bcftais'exemption. The* statement of intent must be in 
gggfing from the client or his representative, or 
I^^The person has a spouse, dependent child, or rel-
[atnre* who lives in the home. 
1x3, Water Rights — All Cases 
^Exclude water rights attached to a house and lot. 
•a.Relative: son, daughter, grandson, granddaughter, 
t stepson, stepdaughter, in-laws, mother, father, step-
mother, stepfather, half-sister, half-brother, niece, 
nephew, grandmother, grandfather, aunt, uncle, sis-
t^eiy brother, stepbrother, or stepsister 
|MljJHousehold Goods and Personal Effects 
K&aind C Cases 
Ipacliide the contents of the home that are essential 
fcdaily. living. However, individual items with an 
tjge over $1,000 must be counted against the asset 
pAuB, and D Cases 
,%li*chide household goods and personal effects only 
tfctthe extent they do not exceed $2,000. 
R;**tln developing this $2,000 limit, if there are no 
*Smde items with a value (as can be currently sold) of 
$500 or more, then do not consider the $2,000 exempt 
amount to be exceeded. 
b. If there are single items with a value of $500 or 
more, then consider all other household goods and 
personal effects to have a value of $1,000. Add the 
single item(s) of $500 or greater value to $1,000, and 
then count the amount in excess of $2,000 towards 
the household's asset level. 
5. Vehicles 
F and C Cases — Exclude the equity value up to 
$1,500 of one car or other motor vehicle used to pro-
vide transportation for the assistance unit. Count any 
equity value in excess of this amount towards the 
household's asset limitation. 
A, B, and D Cases — Exclude one vehicle, regard-
less of value if: 
a. It is necessary for employment; or 
b. It is used at least four times per calendar year 
for obtaining medical treatment; or 
c. It is modified for use by a handicapped person. 
d. It is needed due to climate, terrain, distance or 
other such factors to provide transportation for essen-
tial daily activities. 
If no vehicle is excludable for one of the above rea-
sons, one vehicle may be exempt if its fair market 
value does not exceed $4,500. If its fair market value 
exceeds $4,500, then count the amount in excess to-
wards the asset limit. 
Count the equity value of all other vehicles towards 
asset limits. 
6. Irrevocable Burial Trust — All Cases 
a. Exempt the value of an irrevocable burial trust 
fund such as a pre-arranged funeral plan. 
b. Additionally, only the value of an irrevocable 
burial trust is used to reduce the burial/funeral fund 
exemption (see Sec. 411, (9)). 
7. Life Insurance 
A, B, and D Cases 
a. Whole life insurance policies are exempt if the 
total face value of all such policies does not exceed 
$1,500 per individual. If their total face value exceeds 
$1500 for any individual, count the cash value of all 
that individual's policies against the asset limit. Up 
to $1,500 of the cash value can be exempt if it is used 
as a burial/funeral fund (See 411-9 below). Term in-
surance policies have no cash value, are not re-
sources, and are not used in any way in determining 
countable assets. 
b. Whole life insurance which is exempt must be 
deducted from the exemption level of burial/funeral 
funds (see Sec. 411, (9)). -
Note: The cash value shown on the insurance policy 
table includes some interest. Often the interest paid 
on the cash value is greater than that used to com-
pute the table. Therefore, the table may not show the 
true cash value. This is especially likely in cases of 
policies that have been held for a long time. When 
there is countable cash value that, combined with 
other assets, puts the assets close to the limit, you 
should obtain a current statement of the cash value. 
F and C Cases 
Count the cash value of life insurance policies. 
8. Burial Spaces — All Cases 
a. Exempt burial spaces and any items related to 
repositories used for the remains of the deceased, for 
any member of the client's immediate family. This 
includes caskets, concrete vaults, crypts, urns, grave 
markers, etc Also, if a client owns a grave site, the 
value of which includes opening and closing, the 
value of these services is also excluded. 
b. A burial contract or funeral plan may include 
many of the items exempted in this section. However, 
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these types of contracts are merely promising these1 
items when needed (a plot, a casket, a marker, etc.) 
and are considered to be a part of the contract or p\an> 
They are not evaluated separately. They are consid' 
ered for exemption under Section 411, (9). 
9. Burial/Funeral Fund — All Cases 
Allow a $1,500 burial or funeral fund exemption fof 
each eligible household member. Compute this burial 
or funeral fund exemption as follows: 
a. First, subtract the value of any irrevocable bur' 
ial trust from the $1,500 burial or funeral fund ex-
emption. If the irrevocable burial trust is valued at 
$1,500 or more, it will reduce the burial or funeral 
fund exemption to zero. If that is the case, do not go 
on to steps b. and c. The amount of the irrevocable 
burial trust which exceeds $1,500 is not counted as an 
asset. 
b. Second, for A, B and D categories only, reduce 
the remaining burial or funeral fund exemption by 
the total face value of any exempt whole life insur-
ance policies. If the face value of these policies ex-
ceeds the remaining burial or funeral fund exemp-
tion, it will reduce the burial or funeral fund exemp-
tion to zero. If that is the case, do not go on to step c. 
The amount of face value which exceeds the remain-
ing burial or funeral fund exemption level is not 
counted as an asset. This step does not apply to F and 
G c&tegot\ss as life \n£,\*3rax\£fe \s already oa i^itftd. 
c. If after subtracting the value of the irrevocable 
burial trusts and face value of exempt whole life in-
surance policies there is still a balance in the burial 
or funeral fund exemption, reduce tne remaining ex-
emption level by the cash value of any burial con-
tract, funeral plan, and/or funds set aside for burial. 
d. In A, B, and D cases only, subtract the cash 
value of non-exempt life insurance policies. 
e. If these reductions result in an exemption 
greater than $1,500 then the difference is to be added 
to the other countable assets. 
(1) Any interest which is accrued on an exempt 
burial contract, funeral plan, or on funds set aside for 
burial are exempt from consideration as an asset of 
as income. 
Funds set aside for burial: funds which are sepa-
rately identified and not commingled with other 
funds. They must be clearly designated so that an 
outside observer can see that these funds are specifi-
cally for the client's burial expense. 
(2) If a person ever removes the principle or inter-
est from an exempt burial contract, funeral plan, 
funds set aside for burial, or a life insurance policy 
and uses the money for a purpose other than for their 
burial expenses, the amount withdrawn from the ac-
count must be counted as income. The amount re-
maining in the fund is still exempt. 
If a client has a previously unreported resource 
which he claims is to be used for burial: 
(a) and the resource is clearly designated as being 
for burial, evaluate it for exemption back to when it 
was either designated or intended for burial. How-
ever, the date cannot be before November 1,1982 and 
cannot be any earlier than 2 years prior to the date of 
application. 
(b) and if the case is A, B, or D case and the re-
source is not clearly designated as being for burial, it 
can be designated for burial retroactively back to the 
first day of the month the client intended to set it 
aside for burial. However, the date cannot be before 
November 1, 1982 and cannot be any earlier than 2 
years prior to the date of application. 
10. Land or Accounts Held in Trust — All Case* 
Exclude ownership of beneficial interest in any 
land or account which is held in trust by the United 
State*, * rtste,* t>T \n * tribal *ttfc\a&. 
11. Per Capita Tribal Payments 
Exlude all per capita payments or any asset pur-
chased with per capita payments made to a tribal 
member by the Secretary of the Interior or the tribe. 
12. Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act — All 
Cases 
Exclude shares received as payment under the 
Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (Public Law 
92-203). 
13. Income Producing Property — A 3 , and D 
Cases 
Exclude income producing property from assets 
when the individual's equity in the property does not 
exceed $6,000 and the property produces a net annual 
return of at least 6 percent of the equity. Count any 
equity value in excess of $6,000 only if the 6 percent^ 
net annual return* is met. If it is not then count the 
entire equity amount. 
Net annual return: The income produced after 
subtracting mortgage payments or other payments 
necessary to generate income. 
14. Retroactive Social Security Benefits — All 
Cases 
Exempt lump sum retroactive benefits received 
from the Social Security Administration (SSA and 
SSI) for 6 months after the month of receipt. 
15. Student Benefits 
All Cases 
Do not count monies from certain sources to under-
graduate students as assets. These sources include: 
a. Educational loans, grants or scholarships that 
have funds guaranteed by the U.S Commissioner of 
Education, including: 
— Pell Grants (Formerly BEOG) 
— Supplemental Educational Opportunity Grant 
(SEOG) 
— National Direct Student Loans (NDSL) 
— Guaranteed Student Loans 
— State Student Incentive Grants (SSIG) 
b. Payments to participants of a service learning 
program, such as College Work Study or University 
Year for Action (UYA). 
A, B, and D Cases 
Count any monies which remain after the school 
period covered from an educational grant, loan, or 
scholarship as an asset. 
16. Pension Funds — A, B and D Cases 
Do not count money held in a retirement fund un-
der a plan administered by an employer or union, an 
individual retirement account (IRA), or Keogh ac-
count owned by a spouse or parent ineligible for A, B, 
or D medical. 
a. Count as an asset any available money with-
drawn from the pension starting the month after it is 
withdrawn. 
17. Uniform Gifts to Minors Act (UGMA) — All 
Cases 
Do not count any asset, or the interest from the 
asset, which is held within the rules of the Uniform 
Gift to Minor's Act (UGMA). Count any money from 
the asset given to the child as unearned income. 
Uniform Gift to Minors Act: An irrevocable gift of 
money or property to a child under the age of 21. The 
gift can be made to only one child, with only one 
custodian. The gift is verified on a specific form which 
includes a statement that the custodian holds the as-
set for the child under the Utah UGMA rules. 
18. Cash Payments Given to Help Pay for Medical 
or Social Services. 
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For A, B, and D Medicaid, exclude cash payments 
from federal, state, or local government programs if 
the purpose of the payment is so the client can pay for 
medical or social services. This includes payments for 
vocational rehabilitation. Exclude these payments 
only for one calendar month following receipt. Do not 
confuse this exemption with reimbursements for 
medical or social services; money received as reim-
bursement must be counted as a resource the first 
month following receipt. 
MEDICAL ASSISTANCE GRANTS 42 USCS § 1396a 
(17) include reasonable standards (which shall be comparable for all 
groups and may, in accordance with standards prescribed by the 
Secretary, differ with respect to income levels, but only in the case of 
applicants or recipients of assist^nrp unHer the plan who are not 
receiving aid or assistance under any plan of the State approved under 
title I, X, XIV, or XVI, or part A of title IV [42 USCS §§ 301 et seq., 
1201 et seq., 1351 et seq., 1381 et seq., 601 et seq.], and with respect to 
whom supplemental security income benefits are not being paid under 
title XVI [42 USCS §§ 1381 et seq.], based on the variations between 
shelter costs in urban areas and in rural areas) for determining eligibility 
for and the extent of medical assistance under the plan which (A) are 
consistent with the objectives of this title [42 USCS §§ 1396 et seq.], (B) 
provide for taking into account only such income and resources as are, 
as determined in accordance with standards prescribed by the Secretary, 
available to the applicant or recipient and (in the case of any applicant 
or recipient who would, except for income and resources, be eligible for 
aid or-assistance in the form of money payments under any plan of the 
State approved under title I, X, XIV, or XVI, or part A of title IV [42 
USCS §§ 301 et seq., 1201 et seq., 1351 et seq., 1381 et seq., 601 et seq.], 
or to have paid with respect to him supplemental security income 
benefits under title XVI [42 USCS §§1381 et seq.]) as would not be 
disregarded (or s~et aside for future needs) in determining his eligibility 
for such aid, assistance, or benefits, (C) provide for reasonable evalua-
tion of any such income or resources, and (D) do not take into account 
the financial responsibility of any individual for any applicant or 
recipient of assistance under the plan unless such applicant or recipient 
is such individual's spouse or such individual's child who is under 21 or 
(with respect to States eligible to participate in the State program 
established under title XVI [42 USCS §§1381 et seq.]), is blind or 
permanently and totally disabled, or is blind or disabled as defined in 
section 1614 [42 USCS § 1382c] (with respect to States which are not 
eligible to participate in such program); and provide for flexibility in the 
application of such standards with respect to income by taking into 
account, except to the extent prescribed by the Secretary, the costs 
(whether in the form of insurance premiums or otherwise) incurred for 
medical care or for any other type of remedial care recognized under 
State law; 
SUPPLEMENTAL SECURITY INCOME 42 USCS § 1396aCSu 
(17) except as provided in subsections (1X3). and (mX4)[J include reasonable standards (which shall 
be comparable for all groups and may, in accordance with standards prescribed by the Secretary, 
differ with respect to income levels, but only in the case of applicants or recipients of assistance under 
the plan who are not receiving aid or assistance under any plan of the State approved under title I, 
X XIV. or XVI, or part A of title IV [42 USCS §§ 501 et sec,., 1201 ct seq., 1351 et seq., 1331 et 
seq., 601 et seq.], and with respect to whom supplemental security ineome benefits are not being paid 
under title XVI [42 USCS §§ 1381 et seq.], based on the variations between shelter costs in urban 
areas and in rural areas) for determining eligibility fcr and the extent of medical assistance under the 
plan which (A) are consistent with the objectives of this title [42 USCS §§1396 et seq.]. (B) provide 
for taking into account only such income and resources as are, as determined in accordance witls 
standards prescribed by the Secretary, available to the applicant or recipient and (ia the case of any 
applicant or recipient who would, except for income and resources, be eligible for aid or assistance Id 
the form of money payments under any plan of the State approved under title I, X, XIV, or XVI,"of 
part A of title IV (42 USCS §§ 301 et seq., 1201 et seq., 1351 et seq., 1381 et seq^ 601 ct ieq.), or tq 
have paid.with respect to him supplemental security income benefits under title XVI [42 USCS 
§§1381 et seq.]) as would not be disregarded (or set aside for future needs) in o^erminins ha 
eligibility for such aid, assistance, or benefits, <Q provide for reasonable evaluation of any sbc£ 
income or resources, and (D) do not take into account the financial responsibility of any incUvidual 
for any applicant or recipient of assistance under the plan unless such applicant or recipient b sucK 
individual's spouse or such individual's child who is under 21 or (with respect to States eligible to 
participate in the State program established under title XVI [42 USCS §§ 1381 et seqj), is blind or 
permanently and totally disabled, or Is blind or disabled as defined in section 1614 [42 USCS § 1382c] 
(with respect to States which arc not eligible tc participate in such program); and provide for 
flexibility in the application of such standards with respect to income by taking into account, except 
to the extent prescribed by the Secretary, the costs (whether in the form- of insurance premiums; 
payments made to the State under section 1903(0(2XB) [42 USCS § 1396b(fX2XB)], or otherwise and 
regardless of whether such costs arc reimbursed under another public program of the State or 
political subdivision thereof) incurred fcr medical care or for any other type of remedial care 
recognized under State law; 
